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Trade Regulation—Section 5 of FTC Act—Television Advertising.—
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Cal—Colgate-Palmolive Company televised
three commercials in which "sandpaper" moistened with Rapid Shave was
stroked clean with a safety razor. To compensate for the inadequacies of
television transmission, Colgate had substituted for sandpaper, plexiglass
with sand applied to it.2 The Federal Trade Commission ruled that Colgate
had engaged in two distinct materially deceptive practices,B in violation of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 4 Colgate had represented by
implication, first, that little soaking time was needed before sandpaper
could be shaved, when in fact 80 minutes was required, and second, that
real sandpaper was being used in the advertisement. The Commission
issued a cease-and-desist order 8 which in effect directed Colgate to dis-
continue the use of any undisclosed prop or mock-up in its television adver-
tising. 8
The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission's finding
that Colgate had misrepresented the soaking qualities of its product 7 but,
because the court felt the Commission's order as it pertained to future use
of simulated props was too broad, it directed the Commission to issue a
narrower order. 8
The new order was also brought to the attention of the court of appeals
where it was adjudged to be little more than the original order rephrased .°
The court directed the Commission to enter an order confined to the facts
of the case and to adopt a rule that undisclosed mock-ups shall be prohibited
only where used to demonstrate something which in fact cannot be accom-
plished.10 From this order the Commission petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari. HELD: The Commission's order is sustained. Colgate must
cease and desist from representing falsely, by the use of a prop or mock-up,
that a televised test, experiment, or demonstration provides a viewer with
visual proof of a product claim, regardless of whether the claim is itself
true.11
which would seemingly open the Massachusetts market to the sale of Coffee-Rich in
all marketing situations, including institutional, provided the consumer is made aware
that he is confronted with a non-dairy product. His decree forbids enforcement of sec-
tion 187 against Coffee-Rich "wherever the manufacturer makes a wholesome product
and in no way misleads any reasonable person as to its nature." Coffee-Rich, Inc, v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Health, 209 IsT.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1965).
1 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
2 The televising of sandpaper distorts its texture to make it appear to be nothing
more than colored paper.
3 Colgate-Palmolive Co., 59 F.T.C. 1452, 1476-77 (1961).
4 FTC Act § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964):
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
5 Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 3, at 1477-78.
6 The Supreme Court so interpreted the Commission's order. Supra note 1, at 380.
7 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 19 62).
8 Id. at 94-95.
9 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 517, 519 (1st Cir . 1963).
10 Id. at 523.
11 Supra note 1, at 395.
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The majority, in reaching its decision on the substantive issues," agreed
with the Commission that Colgate had represented: (1) that sandpaper
could be shaved by Rapid Shave; (2) that an experiment had been con-
ducted which verified this claim; and (3) that the viewer was actually see-
ing this demonstration take place for himself." The Court, conceding the
truth of the first two representations, proceeded to determine whether the
substitution of plexiglass for sandpaper was a materially deceptive practice
prohibited by section 5.
The majority agreed with the Commission that the misrepresentation
of any fact, so long as it materially induces a purchaser's decision to buy, is
a deceptive practice in violation of section 5. 14 Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking
for the Court in FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co.," had established this principle.
It was held there that a purchaser is free to buy whatever he chooses from
the seller, but his choice must not be influenced by the seller's false repre-
sentations.
The ruling made in Hutchinson Chem. Corp." was instrumental in bring-
ing "proof of product claim" within the Algoma principle. Hutchinson, the
manufacturer of an automobile polish, televised an advertisement showing
the polish applied, heated by igniting gasoline, and then cooled with water.
They were charged with falsely representing by implication that the commer-
cial proved the polish to be both heat and cold resistant. The examiner
ruled that the FTC Act did not empower the Commission to determine
whether demonstrations do or do not prove sponsor's claims, and that the
Commission could determine only the truth or falsity of the representation
made.17 The Commission reversed and held that this determination did fall
within its section 5 powers," and that a commercial which purports to
prove something that it does not prove is a materially deceptive act since
its purpose is to induce purchase."
The majority fit the instant case into this area of imperfectly proven
product claims. They reasoned that Colgate was offering "visual proof"
that sandpaper could be shaved: Colgate had not merely asserted that
Rapid Shave could shave sandpaper but in effect had asked the skeptical
viewer to, "see for yourself, it does shave sandpaper!' They reasoned that
this "visual proof" of a product claim was designed to induce the consumer
to purchase the product and, since it was not valid proof, it was a materially
deceptive act.2°
12 A procedural issue was also before the Court pertaining to the timeliness of the
petition for certiorari. The issue was resolved in favor of the Commission when it was
determined that the time of the filing of the petition was to begin running from the
date of the second decision of the court of appeals, rather than from the first decision.
Id. at 378-84.
13 Id. at 386.
14 Id. at 386-87.
15 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
16 55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959).
17 Id. at 1944.
18 Id. at 1946-47.
19 Id. at 1947.
20 Supra note 1, at 388-89.
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The majority reached this conclusion by looking at what took place in
the studio, rather than at what image was received by the consumer. They
felt the case was not concerned with modes of communication, but with a
misrepresentation that viewers have objective proof of a seller's product claim
over and above the seller's word. 2 ' They concluded that since Colgate had
represented that sandpaper was being used in the studio, the viewer was
materially deceived.
Assuming, however, as the Court did, that Rapid Shave can soften
sandpaper quickly, there does not seem to be any material deceit. As Mr.
Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in the instant case, 22 in determin-
ing what is or is not materially deceptive, the Court's attention should be
on what is being viewed by the consumer rather than on what is taking
place in the studio. If the consumer receives exactly what was represented,
in this case shaving cream that will soak sandpaper, there can be no material
deception.
This view finds support in Carter Prod. Inc. v. FTC23 where Rise
Shaving Cream was advertised as the wetter lather. A "competing brand" was
shown which was quick drying and rough for shaving. This "competing
brand" was actually a special formula known to Carter not to be a true
representation of the other brands. The court distinguished between mock-ups
which are used to compensate for technical deficiencies in television trans-
mission and those mock-ups used to assert qualities which do not exist. 24
It cited with approval25 the decision of the court of appeals in Colgate26 that,
if what the viewer sees on the television screen is a true representation
of what he will receive when he buys the product, it is immaterial that props
or mock-ups are used to portray this image." The court stated that Carter
had engaged in deceptive practices, not because a mock-up was used to
compensate for the technical limitations in television to prove a product
claim, but because the mock-up distorted the comparison test with an inac-
curate representation. 28
The majority in Colgate compared Colgate's commercial to three types
of activities which had previously been held to constitute false inducements
and therefore deceptive practices violative of section 5: (1) a seller falsely
represents his line of business, as where he asserts that he manufactures a
product when in fact he buys it from other manufacturers and sells it under
his own trade name; 23
 (2) a product is sold at a stated reduced price but the
reduction is from an inflated price rather than from the fair market price; 30
and (3) a product is represented as having been endorsed by a respected
or well-known person or organization, when in truth it never has been so
21 Id. at 388.
22 Id. at 396.
28 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
24 Id. at 531-32.
25 Id. at 530.
28 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, supra note 7.
27 Carter Prod. Inc. v. FTC, supra note 23, at 528-30.
28 Id. at 530.
29 E.g., FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
80 E.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
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certified.31 In each of these three examples, the misrepresentation in no way
affects the quality of ,the article sold, but it does act as an inducement to the
consumer and consequently constitutes a deceptive practice under section 5.33
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, raises an impUrtant distinction between
these condemned activities and the Rapid Shave advertisement. Still assum-
ing that Rapid Shave can soften sandpaper as quickly as it does the mock-up,
there can be no material deception because the consumer receives exactly
what he expected. 33 In each of the above forms of deception, the consumer
does not receive the article as advertised. In the first case, the seller . is not
in that particular line of business so the consumer does not receive the added
assurance of satisfaction that he expected; in the second, the saving expected
never materializes; and in the third, the certification is non-existent so the
assurance again is not received. In the instant case, however, the consumer
receives what he expected, that is, shaving cream which will soak sandpaper
sufficiently for shaving. This should be the determining factor of what is
materially deceptive.
The Court's decision does not make the use of all undisclosed mock-ups
illegal per se. The majority distinguished between those mock-ups used
merely for illustration purposes and those which offer proof of a product
claim. Only the latter are declared unlawf u1. 34
 However, these areas of
proof and illustration so overlap that a clear separation between them will
be impossible in many instances. Thus, advertisers who in good faith use a
prop in what they honestly believe to be an illustration may find themselves
being brought before the Commission for using a mock-up to prove a product
claim. For example, a manufacturer advertising a liquid product may add
coloring to illustrate the true color of his product to the viewer. The Com-
mission, however, may hold that the coloring misrepresents the richness of
the product and is, consequently, proof of a product claim and a false in-
ducement in violation of section 5.
The decision in the instant case does not consider the situation in which
an advertiser takes advantage of television transmission to enhance the
appearance of an inferior product. For example, a manufacturer might offer
towels which are barely fit for ordinary use, but because of imperfect trans-
mission, color35
 and texture would appear luxurious. The majority in
Colgate might say that the viewer has been deceived, if at all, only by the
inadequacies of television, not by the advertiser, since the Court apparently
demands absolute truth only in the studio. If, on the other hand, the
Court prohibited transmitting "up" (the use of transmission peculiarities
to enhance the product's qualities), television demonstrations would be limited
to those products which transmit with perfect fidelity or transmit "down"
(televising detracts from their appearance). The television industry would
then lose a considerable amount of demonstrative advertising. It is true that
31 E.g., Niresk Indust., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960).
32 Id. at 339; FTC v. Royal Milling Co., supra note 29, at 216-17; FTC v. Standard
Educ. Soc'y, supra note 30, at 116-17.
33 Supra note 1, at 396-97.
34 Id. at 392-93.
35 E.g., a light blue article in the studio may appear sparkling white to the viewer.
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these advertisers could and probably would shift to other types of televi-
sion commercials. It is submitted, however, that there is a trend in our
complex market economy toward great distances between buyers and sellers.
Demonstrative advertising is necessary to compensate for the informational
gap which results from this separation. Therefore, the alternatives facing
the Court in the towel hypothetical would be to (1) allow transmitting up
and the consequent consumer deception, or (2) forbid it, causing the buying
public to lose a large segment of desirable demonstrative advertising.
Returning to the decision in the instant case, similar economic ramifica-
tions may be seen. The majority, in forbidding the use of mock-ups, has
condemned makers of products which transmit down to the dilemma of
committing suicide by televising down or abandoning informative television
demonstrations.
It appears that the majority has placed on the television industry the
burden of improving technologically or losing a considerable segment of
demonstration advertising. It would further seem that any adaptation inside
the television camera or use of a colored filter over the camera lens to make
white transmit as white (or sandpaper transmit as sandpaper) would be a
permissible measure to compensate for the difficulties inherent in all light
transmission. But, both are manipulations of the truth and in effect are
no different than a mock-up. Yet, here the axe would fall, though the result
is the same and only the method employed in the studio is different.
In summary, the majority may have lost sight of the objective of sec-
tion 5, namely, the protection of the consumer. Its decision provides section
5 protection only to the consumer who needs no protection since he has
received exactly• what he expected, and places unreasonable burdens on
television advertisers and the television industry.
ROBERT J. USKEVICH
Workmen's Compensation—Full Faith and Credit—Provision for Exclu-
sive Jurisdiction in Administrative Board.—Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co. -1—
Petitioner, a resident of Alabama, was injured in that state while in the
employ of Lawler Construction, a Georgia corporation. At the time of injury
both he and his employer were under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation ,
Act.2 Petitioner brought suit against Lawler in an Alabama court under the
Georgia act and was awarded a default judgment. To enforce this judgment,
the petitioner instituted a diversity action against Zurich Insurance, the
workmen's compensation carrier for Lawler, in a federal district court in
Alabama. Zurich filed a motion to dismiss, contending that since the Georgia
act invested primary jurisdiction in the Industrial Accident Board of Georgia, 2
the Alabama court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the default
1 85 Sup. Ct. 769 (1965).
2 Ga. Code Ann. § 114 (1956).
3 Ga. Code Ann, § 54-108 (1960).
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